Congress assigned the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the responsibility to implement and enforce those provisions.
11 These laws and EPA's compliance and enforcement efforts have made a significant impact on the quality of the environment in the United States. 12 These laws did not, however, empower EPA or any other federal agency to require environmental stewardship or to incentivize improvements beyond compliance with applicable statutes. 13 As a result of these statutory and regulatory voids, some scholars and regulators have focused on the ability of voluntary regulation to address current environmental concerns.
14 Two of the most well-known and prolific authors writing about voluntary regulation, Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, observed, " [w] ith only remote prospects for statutory and regulatory solutions to environmental concerns about global warming and exposure to toxic substances, among other things, voluntary approaches are one of the few means through which government is currently able to respond." 15 An environmental management system (EMS) is a systematic planning, implementation, and review process that organizations use to continuously improve environmental performance. 16 The importance of EMSs as a wellrecognized environmental management tool is demonstrated by the widespread use and steady increase in implementation of EMSs by facilities 10 See, e.g., JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET 135, 137 (2015) . ("RCRA establishes a federal regulatory structure that governs the treatment and disposal of 'hazardous wastes,' which are defined as a subset of 'solid waste' for waste management purposes.").
11 MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 ("The authorities and responsibilities of [EPA] derive primarily from a dozen major environmental statutes."). 12 RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 6; see also Case, Lost Generation, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that the environmental protection statutes from the 1960s and 1970s are "credited with substantial, albeit insufficient success in reducing pollution and improving environmental quality in many ways"). 13 RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9 at 5-6; see also MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 10, at 16 ("Like most federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act is enforced primarily by states or local governments; they issue most permits, monitor compliance, and conduct the majority of inspections. The federal government functions as a backstop, with authority to review state actions.").
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and organizations throughout the world.
17
The major outlier to this worldwide trend is the United States; EPA shut down an experimental program designed to encourage the implementation of EMSs in facilities in the United States. 18 In contrast, the European Commission has made its EMS-based program a cornerstone of its environmental regulations, and also touts its own participation in that program as leadership-by-example to improve the environment. 19 An analysis of these two management-based regulatory programs is particularly timely in light of the management-based approach included in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, 20 and a parallel focus by corporate counsel on compliance and regulatory issues as their top two concerns. 21 Because management systems such as an EMS employ an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to operations and compliance, 22 they also provide a proven framework for compliance 17 ORG. FOR 19 See Eur . Comm'n Directorate-General, About Us, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/environment/ index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); Eur. Comm'n, EMAS in the European Institutions, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/emas_registrations/emas_in_the_european_institutions_ en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) ("The European Commission was the first EU Institution to become registered with EMAS. Other EU institutions are also responding to the challenge of taking responsibility for their environmental impacts. The European Commission EMAS team members are proud and honored to have served sometimes as 'mentors' to their colleagues in setting up the scheme in other institutions -'Walking the talk', as we say!"). EMAS as an environmental program of the European Union is an appropriate level of governance to compare to Performance Track. The European Union "functions as a form of federal government" and has "nearly unrestricted authority to legislate" in environmental protection COUNS., Jan. 27, 2016, http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202748157588/Survey-GCs-Report-anAstounding-Rise-in-Regulatory-Risk?slreturn=20160108124628 (last visited Part II describes what EMSs are, how they operate, and why they are important in a global context. Part III discusses how the European Union has utilized EMSs as the base of EMAS, and how EMAS has developed over its 20 years of existence. It also describes how U.S. federal regulators promoted the use of EMSs during the Clinton and Bush presidencies through an initiative that evolved into the Performance Track program, but then reversed that policy and suspended Performance Track at the beginning of the Obama administration. Part IV evaluates the literature on the claimed impact each of these programs has had on environmental performance and compliance. The EU studies have examined a wider range of environmental performance impacts, while the U.S. studies have focused on the delivery of 23 26 Part V discusses the relative merits of two regulatory approaches and suggests possibilities for further research. The Article concludes that the Europe Union's EMAS program demonstrates the potential EMS-based regulations have to produce significant environmental performance and compliance benefits, and that the United States and other nations could benefit from finding ways to utilize EMSs for transforming national governmental environmental regulation from enforcing a set of baseline rules for compliance to instigating actions that improve our global environment.
II. AN EMS PRIMER
EMSs are used in over 170 countries around the globe. 27 The emergence of EMSs coincided with the exploration of transforming regulatory systems from governmental command-and-control policies to more flexible regimes that allow private actors a greater range of options to meet governmental requirements. 28 At the same time, the laws of individual nation-states have become just one of several considerations operating entities must take into account to compete in an increasingly global marketplace. iioc.org/environmental-management-iso-14001 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) ("Organisations certified to ISO 14001 in over 170 countries is testament to the leading management system in the sustainability field."). Private regulation is often viewed as an alternative to public regulation. It tends to develop where there are gaps in public regulation. Private environmental governance has thrived in the United States, for example, in the absence of significant new legislation. Gaps may also be present because existing governmental institutions cannot reach certain activity. Economic globalization has been an important driver of private regulation because governmental actors lack sufficient authority to regulate against many of the negative social externalities of international economic activity.
Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted). "Oft-cited advantages of private regulation include the proximity of the regulator to the regulated activity, the flexibility of the regulatory process, greater compliance, and additional regulatory resources." Id. at 316; see also Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 640 (2009) ("Adoption of ISO standards has encouraged convergence in corporate behavior worldwide. ISO standards and certification are reinforcing the idea within multinational corporations that use of uniform operating standards and practices with respect to pollution, worker safety, and other matters may ultimately be cheaper and more efficient than the maintenance of multiple standards or practices, even when applicable regulatory standards vary across the countries in which the multinational corporations operate. The voluntary adoption of privately promulgated international standards by businesses worldwide has driven convergence of corporate behavior and correspondingly the expectations and norms of the public and government officials."). 29 For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act requires the production of health and environmental studies from parent and affiliates, even if located outside the United States. U.S. ENVTL. PROT EMSs provide an internationally recognized standard for evaluating environmental processes. 30 In addition, they have been suggested as a tool for providing a more uniform global approach to environmental governance 31 as well as leveraging the capabilities of constrained environmental enforcement agencies, something particularly important for developing nations.
32
Despite their widespread prevalence, EMSs are not often mentioned in standard legal textbooks on environmental law, 33 and many legal practitioners and scholars may not be familiar with them. However, as described below, they are an increasingly important mechanism in worldwide environmental governance, compliance programs, and supply chains.
34 Therefore, it is important to understand what they are, how they work, and how they interact with regulations and compliance.
A. What Is an EMS?
An EMS is a globally recognized tool for evaluating and improving environmental performance. 35 The process underlying an EMS is the establishment of a management system for production that was originally 41 ISO then chose that globally successful series as the basis for its ISO 14000 series to improve environmental performance in a manner similar to the improvements achieved for product quality through the implementation of the ISO 9000 series. 42 The core principle of management systems is the delivery of improved performance through improvements in processes. 43 EMSs can be implemented throughout an entire company, for a facility, or just for certain activities. 44 Once a company or facility develops an environmental policy and identifies requirements as well as other desirable environmental endpoints ("plan"), the company or facility implements what is necessary to achieve those endpoints ("do"), then evaluates whether the implementation is successful ("check"), and finally corrects any deficiencies that are found ("act"). 46 The action to correct the deficiencies then becomes part of a new plan-do-check-act cycle, and should result in continuous environmental improvement. 47 The widely used ISO 14000 series provides companies with guidance on overall management of their environmental responsibilities. 48 This series consists of 14001, which establishes the requirements for an EMS meeting ISO standards and gives guidance for use in operations, and several other additional standards for other environmental aspects such as communication, auditing, labeling, and reporting of greenhouse gases.
49 ISO 14001 was originally adopted in 1996, revised in 2004, and again in 2015, with the newest version referred to as 14001:2015.
50 Some have criticized ISO 14001 for the focus on improving environmental systems rather than environmental performance, and the lack of disclosure requirements for most environmental information.
51
Changes include incorporating environmental management into an organization's strategic plan, adding an environmental performance improvement component in addition to the existing environmental management improvement requirement, and developing a communications strategy with equal emphasis on internal and external communications, but without any requirement to engage in external communications. 46 Case, Changing Corporate Behavior, supra note 38, at 89-90. 47 Id. at 90. 48 See ISO 14000, supra note 42. 49 Id. Over 50% of the certifications were in East Asia and the Pacific, 37.5% were in Europe, and North America accounted for only 2.7%. 56 The growth of EMSs has not been driven by legal requirements. Instead, many governmental organizations developed programs, including EMAS and Performance Track, to incentivize or otherwise to encourage the implementation of EMSs. A good overview of the role EMSs have played to date in governmental programs is given by an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study issued in 2009. 57 The study examined environmental compliance assurance regimes in eight countries representing diverse institutional, legal, and cultural backgrounds, including four European countries, Japan, and the United States, all members of OECD, along with China and Russia, two non-OECD members.
58
The report found a transition in many OECD countries from traditional regulatory compliance programs to voluntary initiatives more focused on encouraging innovation and sustainability, including the use of EMSs. 59 One of the study's conclusions was that environmental authorities of OECD countries no longer considered it necessary to promote the implementation of EMSs. 60 The reason given was that international market pressure was a far 60 See id. at 52-53 (noting a distinct change from the active encouragement of EMSs in the 1990s when governments adopted incentives such as permitting privileges and decreased compliance inspections).
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A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS 823 "more powerful factor" than regulatory agencies, 61 including for example, the impact of demands from large corporations on their suppliers for good environmental performance. 62 However, this begs the question: Why do these large corporations require EMSs to support their environmental requirements? Could it be because they themselves participate in EMAS, or, at the time, Performance Track, which would mean that these programs still played a role? The report did not answer these questions. Even if governmental incentives were not a major factor, however, the fact that corporations are creating a significant demand for EMSs means that they concluded that EMSs have substantial value.
In contrast, authorities in China continue to actively encourage companies to get EMS certifications. 63 China's State Bureau of Technical and Quality Supervision adopted standards from the ISO 14000 series and approved a national ISO 14001 certification program. 64 There are also several economic incentives in China for obtaining ISO 14001 certification. 65 One of the key trends identified in the OECD report, "clearly visible in all the countries," is the increasing reliance on compliance promotion, which includes encouraging the adoption of EMSs. 66 Additional trends that can be facilitated by EMSs include targeting compliance monitoring by risk, selfmonitoring by regulated entities, and enhancing transparency and public discussion.
C. The Relationship of EMSs to Environmental Performance and Compliance
EMSs are aptly described as a "holistic approach to environmental compliance, focusing on the entire company's interaction with the environment and environmental regulations, instead of a piecemeal approach." 68 Several different departments, disciplines, and external stakeholders collaborate to implement an EMS, which provides many benefits. 69 In addition, compliance is a required element of most EMSs, 73 and EMSs have been recognized as useful in facilitating compliance. 74 The identification and assessment of legal obligations, in addition to operational requirements and goals, is required; therefore, compliance professionals, including lawyers, should be involved in the EMS process at a facility. This involvement facilitates a better understanding by those compliance professionals of the impact that legal rules have when implemented, while also providing valuable information that can help those compliance officers to better explain legal rules to their clients and coworkers. 75 Another important benefit of incorporating an ISO 14001 EMS into a company's compliance structure is that it is a globally recognized process for monitoring compliance and enhancing environmental performance. 76 The operations of an increasing number of businesses are governed by the laws and regulations of more than one country. 77 International market demands have also driven the adoption of EMSs. 78 In fact, some consider the ISO corporate level, the plant level, or to address a specific issue." (internal quotation marks omitted)). ("Results from our empirical analysis imply that joining ISO 14001 reduced facilities' time spent out of compliance by about 7% or 25 days out of a year."). 75 As an environmental counsel for several years to a global Swiss-based manufacturing company, the Author was involved in many aspects of EMSs, which she found to be very beneficial to the implementation of environmental compliance. 76 In addition, if the facility is owned by a corporation with its headquarters in another jurisdiction, the laws of that jurisdiction may also apply to the operation of that facility, either directly 81 or indirectly through corporate policies that seek to have uniform rules apply to all of the corporation's operations. 82 Therefore, EMSs can assist lawyers and other compliance personnel trained in the law of one country to better assess a company's operations in other jurisdictions. 83 A main concern regarding the use of EMSs as part of a regulatory regime is whether the information developed by EMSs is sufficiently reliable to determine a facility's compliance with all requirements and to assess whether an EMS is producing environmental benefits beyond those achieved by compliance. 84 However, "there is substantial support for the point that implementation of an EMS is associated with better environmental performance, both on regulated emissions and on the use of resources that are not directly regulated. Control Act requirement to produce health and environmental studies from parent companies and affiliates, even if the entity in possession of the date is located outside the United States). 82 Yang & Percival, supra note 28, at 639-40. 83 Id. at 640 n.141. 84 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 36, at 18-19 (identifying the value of systematic management as a benefit, but noting several other reservations about the ability of EMSs to deliver benefits sufficient to justify concessions that might be given to induce their implementation). In particular, they urged policymakers to distinguish between the effects caused by an EMS from those that might have resulted from other factors already in a company.
Id. In a subsequent study of the Performance Track program in the United States, they confirmed the validity of that concern for that program. 87 A majority (54%) of the responses were from user organizations with over 250 employees. 88 Of the nineteen environmental management concepts identified in a report on future challenges, 77% of environmental managers viewed ISO 14001's ability to meet legal requirements as providing high or very high value. 89 Another potential benefit that can flow from EMSs is the public disclosure and sharing of information produced by the process, and many EMS standards and guidelines require the production of information to make operations more transparent.
90
This transparency, in turn, provides information that can be used in many different ways beyond simply improving company operations. 91 
99
The core of EMAS is an ISO 14001 EMS. 100 However, EMAS has identified several areas where its requirements go beyond the ISO 14001 standard, including a requirement for extensive public disclosure of the environmental performance information of its members. 101 A further difference is compliance because EMAS makes participants "demonstrate that they have identified, and know the implications . . . of all applicable legal requirements relating to the environment, . . . provide for legal compliance . . . , and have procedures in place that enable the organisation to meet these requirements on an ongoing basis." 102 EMAS also requires compliance audits. 103 The most recent EMAS scheme, EMAS III, implemented in 2010, sought to address the continuing concern regarding how to best measure and verify the benefits achieved by facilities and companies incorporating the EMAS requirements into their operations. 104 The current EMAS scheme requires organizations to report on six specific environmental core indicators in an effort to allow "organisations [to] compare their environmental performance both over different reporting periods and with the environmental performance of other organisations." 105 The core ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 46:811 indicators are: energy efficiency, material efficiency, water, waste, biodiversity, and emissions. 106 Beyond recognition as a member of EMAS, incentives to join the program have been left to the "competent bodies" of individual nations.
107
The most prevalent incentive used by competent bodies is extending the duration of an organization's permit. 108 Other measures include reduction of financial guarantees required for some activities, tax reduction, inspection frequency reduction and self-declaration for renewing a permit.
109
Since 2010, the number of organizations participating in in EMAS has varied, from a peak of almost 4,700 in April 2011, to a low of under 3,800 in December 2013, with an increase to over 4,000 again in May 2016. 110 The number of sites registered with EMAS for the same time period went from a peak of over 10,000 in December 2013, to a low of under 7,000 in March 2014. 111 The current number is just over 9,000. 112 For the years during which Performance Track was in place, there were more than 2,800 organizations and sites registered with EMAS in March 2000, 113 and more than 4,200 organizations and 6,700 sites at the end of 2008.
114 EMAS membership may have declined slightly due to the more stringent requirements imposed by the 2010 revision to EMAS III. 115 106 Id. at 37. 107 Orts, supra note 95, at 1307 ("Invoking the subsidiarity principle, the EMAS regulation devolves responsibility to the EU Member States to 'establish a system for the accreditation of independent environmental verifiers' and to supervise them. Each Member State must either designate a 'competent body' for the task or 'use existing accreditation institutions.'" (footnote omitted) ( It was "based on the premise that government should complement existing programs with new tools and strategies that not only protect people and the environment, but also capture opportunities for reducing costs and spurring technological innovation." 120 The key criteria for Performance Track participation were: 1) an audited EMS; 2) a record of compliance; 3) beyond-compliance commitments; and 4) community outreach.
121
In establishing beyondcompliance commitment achievements, EPA selected categories of environmental indicators from which participating facilities could choose, and also set some measuring criteria. 122 The Representatives approved a bill that significantly reduced funding for Performance Track, and shortly thereafter, Lisa P. Jackson, the EPA Administrator appointed by newly elected President Obama, terminated the program. 124 In the last year of the program's operations, 2008, the number of new participants declined although the total number of participants rose, largely because of an 85% renewal rate, which the Performance Track program sponsors found to be significant given the recession at the time.
125
The total number of participating facilities on a yearly basis, however, never exceeded 600. 126 Since the decision to withdraw Performance Track, EPA has not publicly engaged in any further consideration of implementing programs to encourage the use of EMSs.
Although Performance Track is gone, some significant U.S. governmental programs acknowledging the value of EMSs remain. 127 The United States federal government continues to rely on EMSs as the "primary management approach" to achieve its own sustainability goals for all federal agencies. 128 139 and an article examining Performance Track, based in part on another study commissioned by EPA that was conducted by PROGRESS 9 (1999), ("EPA has waived or reduced penalties for companies that voluntarily audit, disclose, and correct environmental violations and that take action to prevent future ones.").
al. eds., Spring 2016 ed.) (regarding use in consent decrees). 132 140 These studies were chosen because they were all commissioned or performed by the respective regulatory authority, the Directorate-General of the European Commission (DG Environment) 141 and EPA. They are similar in their approach and the information they collected, which included; literature reviews; interviews with regulatory authorities, participants, and stakeholders; and analyses of program data.
142
It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is very hard to assess the available information on the performance of these voluntary programs. As the RAND Corporation noted in its 2010 study of Performance Track:
[A]s VPs [voluntary programs] have become more common, researchers have developed academic theories to explain why VPs may -or may not -be effective. Some researchers have created economic models of VPs that build on principles of incentives, while others have created theoretical frameworks derived from observing existing programs. However, there is no interdisciplinary consensus on how to study or explain VPs, and there is no generally accepted theory of how VPs should work. Rather, the literature has proposed theories to explain features of VPs and examined the empirical evidence on their impacts.
143
A report issued by EPA's Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) also found that there was not sufficient information to quantify the benefits of implementing EMSs in order to achieve recognition in the capital markets.
144
A. EMAS DG Environment commissioned two comprehensive studies to evaluate the benefits and costs of EMAS registration. The first study, completed in 2009, investigated the benefits and costs to organizations that register with EMAS, as well as incentives and barriers to participation. 145 One of the study's key objectives was to explore the kinds of benefits organizations 140 Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14 (the research underlying the article was partially funded by a grant from EPA's Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation). 141 Eur. Comm'n, Environment Directorate-General, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ environment/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting that the DG Environment is the European Commission department responsible for setting environmental policy for the European Union).
142 JAN VERNON ET AL., supra note 137, at i; Iraldo Presentation, supra note 25, at 4; Testa et al, supra note 25, at 2233-37; Daddi et al., supra note 25, at 648-52; OIG PERFORMANCE TRACK REPORT, supra note 123, at 3; RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at xiv-xv.
143 RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 80 (citation omitted). participating in EMAS receive, and in particular to document "soft" benefits in addition to more easily measured economic costs and benefits. 146 The study included "looking inside the black box of internal organisational management in order to understand what kinds of internal characteristics determine an organisation's capacity to reap benefits from EMAS, as well as influencing the costs of registration and implementation." 147 That study concluded that the main benefits to EMAS members were increased efficiency and energy savings, with the results showing "clear evidence of substantial financial savings from reduced energy costs following EMAS." 148 The study also noted, however, that those benefits are likely to dwindle over time because they will be hard to continuously replicate those savings.
149
The second main benefit was the reduction in negative environmental incidents.
150
The second most widely acknowledged benefit of EMAS in the questionnaire was a reduction in negative incidents. This result was reinforced in follow up interviews, where several manufacturing organisations confirmed that the implementation of a robust EMS had given them an overview of their processes and facilitated greater control, leading to a reduction in incidents and a reduced effort for internal monitoring. This has obvious linkages with benefits relating to improved relations with regulatory authorities. This evidence relating to reduced incidents is important, as similar evidence was not found in the literature review.
151
Weighing against the potential gain from avoidance of accidents, EMASs cost on average 48,000 implement, and the 26,000 annually thereafter to maintain. 152 The most important barrier to registration identified in the study was that the benefits of registration were "unclear of [sic] did not justify the costs" of registration," 153 DG Environment commissioned another study, the results of which were reported at the High Level Conference on EMAS in November 2015. 154 The key research questions addressed by the study were: 1) If a public body promotes EMAS, is it effectively pursuing environmental improvement; and 2) what are the different roles for a public body? 155 The study included a survey of 467 registered organizations and an analysis of the required 146 Id. at 1. 147 One of the key findings was that about 75% of the interviewees believed that the prevention of risks and accidents improved, with 30% of all interviewees stating that the improvement was significant. 157 This confirmed the results found in the previous EMAS study, discussed above. The environmental statement analysis found that EMAS members continued to demonstrate improvements in energy use, improved their air and carbon dioxide emissions, had no improvements in water consumption, and had negative results for waste and material efficiency. 158 The interviewees stated that the EMS used to fulfill the EMAS requirements was second only to technical progress as the most important factors for the performance improvements. 159 The study also noted several other improvements in addition to performance, including legislative compliance, and, as mentioned above, reduced risk of environmental sanctions and accidents. 162 OIG concluded that the program's design was not clearly linked to intended outcomes, that it did not generally fulfill its "value proposition," and that some members exceeded their sector averages for noncompliance and toxic releases. 163 While the Performance Track program managers concurred with OIG's recommendations for improvements, they did dispute much of OIG's methodology and analysis, and also believed that OIG did not give sufficient credit for the benefits the program did achieve. 
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The RAND Corporation completed its study of Performance Track in 2010, after the program terminated. 165 The study was started, however, in 2008 to address the criticisms in and issues raised by OIG's report, including whether the initial concepts were sound, whether the program design reflected those concepts, and whether the program played a role in delivering environmental improvements. 166 The report confirmed OIG's concern about the lack of detail in the program's concepts. 167 In contrast to OIG's report, it found that Performance Track encouraged a broad range of environmental improvements among most of its members. 168 These improvements were more qualitative and quantitative, including: the application process taught them how to quantify the broad environmental impacts of their activities and set goals for continuous improvement. Performance Track's members also reported a range of changes in their corporate culture, including increased consideration of environmental issues in formal decision-making processes, greater employee awareness and engagement on environmental issues, the introduction of environmental considerations into informal problem-solving efforts, and improved recruiting results, employee retention, and employee morale. 169 Another finding was that the "brand" of the program was undermined because environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some regulators believed membership criteria to be too lenient and some members withdrew because they decided that the costs outweighed the benefits.
170
In response to a final purpose of the report, to evaluate whether there was a regulatory role for the approach represented by Performance Track in combination with other regulatory approaches, the report concluded that voluntary programs, including some of the features of Performance Track, "can complement regulatory approaches to accelerate environmental improvements" and that EPA should continue to experiment with such programs. 171 The report gave four conditions for successful experimentation: The most recent extensive study of the Performance Track program, by Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, concluded that the program did not have mechanisms to verify that members were top environmental performers, nor did the program deliver additional environmental benefits.
173 Additional conclusions were: 1) Performance Track attracted facilities that valued recognition and actively sought to engage with regulators and their communities, and therefore Performance Track was not producing actions different than those companies would have done without Performance Track; and 2) companies did not think that voluntary programs with high goals and standards were worth the cost. 174 This last point is particularly noteworthy because the study found tha t regul at or y i ncentives• tha t regul at or y i ncentives• t ha t regul at or y i ncentives• h a t regul at or y i ncentives •such as fewer inspections and shorter processing times•were not significant enough to offset the perceived costs to meet higher standards, and are inherently limited by the different ways EPA and facility managers value the costs and benefits of voluntary programs. 175 Finally, the authors concluded that voluntary programs will likely never deliver more than "modest additions to core regulatory activities." 176 C. Comparative Analysis As explained above, the EMAS program has continued to evaluate ways to develop and improve the program, consistent with the RAND Assessment recommendations for successful implementation of experimental programs and the EMS continuous improvement cycle described above. The EMAS requirements for public disclosure, legal compliance audits, and reports on six core environmental indicators to provide a basis for comparing performance could address the concerns about Performance Track's poor 172 Id. at 89. 173 Coglianese & Nash, Performance Track's Postmortem, supra note 14, at 82-83. 174 Id. at 82-83. 175 Id. at 83. 176 Id. compliance records, and the program's failure to clearly and consistently articulate its goals.
177
Another important difference between EMAS and Performance Track is the European Commission's endorsement of the EMAS program and the value of environmental management systems, including European Commission participation in the EMAS program itself and public disclosure of the results of its participation.
178 While successive presidents have ordered all federal agencies to incorporate EMSs into their operations-a clear acknowledgement of their value-there never was any pronouncement endorsing Performance Track throughout the federal government.
179
The EMAS studies also found "[p]ersuasive evidence . . . for a number of benefits arising from EMAS registration, including reduced costs for raw materials and waste management, achieving regulatory compliance, competitive advantage, regulatory relief (manufacturing sector) and improved personnel motivation," 180 and significant decreases in negative environmental incidents.
181 This latter finding is particularly noteworthy for environmental protection and was not mentioned in any of the Performance Track evaluations. 182 In fact, the Coglianese and Nash article states that an analysis by a consulting firm retained by the authors found that Performance Track facilities had a "slightly higher-than-average risk to public health" when compared to all facilities required to submit reports under EPA's toxic release regulations. 183 That finding is interesting in light of the EMAS studies showing that EMAS produced better risk management.
184 Therefore, there could be an additional benefit from having facilities like these participate in a program like EMAS.
In contrast, OIG's report and the Coglianese and Nash article questioned the positive results reported by the Performance Track 177 See supra Part IV.B. The RAND Assessment noted concerns about the reliability of facility compliance records. RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 55. The report stated that regulators at all levels confirmed that EPA databases to not always reflect facility compliance status as recorded by the states who conduct the inspections, and that EPA has "large-scale, systemic, federal-state data-entry and data-sharing problems" which "created an ongoing publicrelations problem for Performance Track." Id 185 The article highlighted findings in OIG's report that some Performance Track members had more toxic emissions than the average for their sectors and some had "non-trivial compliance problems." 186 The authors also concluded that the program might not have delivered the claimed environmental benefits because some members who joined were already involved in efforts that would deliver those benefits. 187 OIG, however, found that "most [Performance Track] members outperformed their sectors for compliance and toxic releases." 188 Additionally it noted that "[t]he presence of underperforming facilities reduce[d] the integrity and value of the Performance Track brand." 189 The conclusion drawn in the Coglianese and Nash article, that the program could not demonstrate it attracted "top performers" rather than "extroverts" for membership is particularly interesting. 190 The authors state that Performance Track members had top-level management support, a higher level of support for internal environmental activities, were more interested in opinions from communities and environmental groups, and valued government recognition more than their competitors who did not apply to join Performance Track. 191 Yet none of these factors were deemed relevant to superior environmental performance; instead, they were considered factors that made them extroverts. 192 The RAND Assessment, however, found:
A broad range of state and federal regulators, environmental NGOs, and members felt that [voluntary programs] provide an effective way to improve the flow of information and create new relationships among facilities and between regulated facilities and regulators. Stakeholders uniformly felt that [voluntary programs] should supplement more-traditional regulatory approaches by identifying and sharing information with firms and facilities to help them improve their environmental performance.
193
The RAND Assessment finding is consistent with the several benefits EMS disclosures can provide, as described in Part II.C.
194
The Coglianese and Nash article did note that the comparable nonPerformance Track companies the authors found to compare with the Performance Track members (to assess whether the claimed benefits were achieved as a result of Performance Track) all had EMSs. 195 The fact that all these comparable companies that had compliance records similar to Performance Track also had EMSs is further evidence that EMSs may play an important role is achieving good compliance.
The studies of both EMAS and Performance Track did have some similar findings. The lack of program recognition was a main factor for organizations deciding not to participate in both programs. 196 Another finding similar to both programs was a concern about the cost of implementing the requirements of each program, 197 although in the 2009 EMAS study 22% of those who withdrew said that the cost was not a factor. 198 One further finding in the Coglianese and Nash article is that there is an inverse relationship between the rewards a governmental program can offer and participation in a voluntary program because of the additional 193 RAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 89. 194 In fact, because the Coglianese and Nash study indicates there may be no recognizable benefit to being an extrovert it raises the question whether companies should invest in the "extrovert" activities identified, such as top level management support for environmental initiatives, additional environmental personnel or governmental and community relations. See Coglianese 199 has not been addressed in the EMAS studies.
Because the Performance Track program was never given the opportunity to address the concerns raised and incorporate the suggestions made by OIG and the RAND Assessment, the United States lost the opportunity to make changes to address criticisms and to evaluate the potential for such programs at the federal level.
200 This is especially significant given the inability of the United States government to enact any new environmental legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
There is clearly a difference between the adoption of EMSs by facilities and organizations in Europe and the United States that goes beyond the European Union's commitment to its EMAS program compared with the withdrawal of Performance Track in the United States. The number of certified ISO 14001 EMSs in the European Union is currently about eighteen times the number in the United States, and that ratio has not been less than about nine times more certifications since 2006. 201 In fact, many facilities with EMSs in the United States are multinational corporations with their headquarters located abroad, 202 demonstrating an even greater difference between EMS implementation by American companies compared to their foreign counterparts.
A few reasons have been suggested as the underlying cause for this difference. In one study on cross-national variations in the adoption of EMSs by companies, the authors studied the response of firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany to EMAS and ISO 14001. 203 In the United States and Germany, the relationship between the environmental regulators and the industries is considered adversarial, due to their command-andcontrol policies as well as the presence of politically strong environmental movements. 204 In comparison, British environmental regulation is for the most part locally based rather than nationally based. 205 Companies negotiate operating permits with local authorities who are legally authorized to take local environmental and economic conditions into account and who seldom take violators to court. 206 Yet, uptake of EMAS in Germany and ISO 14001 in the United Kingdom is high, but low in the United States, so adversarial environmental regulation does not explain the difference. 207 The authors of the study concluded that Germany's passage of detailed laws to implement EMAS in Germany, using EMAS "like a command-and-control instrument designed to oversee and measure firm environmental performance," facilitated the growth of EMAS and ISO 14001. 208 In the United States, however, the public's ability to challenge governmental actions in court creates substantive uncertainty about whether a regulation will be upheld and enforced, and creates fears of expensive litigation that affect the willingness of companies to implement EMSs. 209 This difference may provide an explanation and helpful insight into the current situation, but should not deter efforts to overcome those hurdles considering the benefits EMSs can produce.
To address today's environmental challenges more effectively, we need to move beyond environmental protection to sustainability. 210 Although command-and-control regulation has achieved many significant improvements, more recently it has been found to be "too costly, overlyprescriptive and, in some instances, ineffective." 211 Moreover, "[s]ustainability initiatives tend to be characterized by innovation, adaptability, continuous change, and systematic thinking, and these are not always easy to harmonize with a statutorily driven, top-down regulatory ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 46:811 system addressing specific issues in a narrowly targeted way." 212 The plando-check-act cycle of EMSs provide the perfect platform for the "innovation, adaptability, continuous change, and systematic thinking" required for sustainability.
213
Given the inherent range of possible benefits EMSs can provide-from interdisciplinary problem solving to systematic assessment and correctionfurther research, experimentation, and evaluation are warranted to determine which EMS programs to encourage through the enactment of reflexive laws. 214 These governmental programs need to establish clear goals and concepts before giving significant benefits to regulated entities, 215 but there can and should be further experimentation to explore the possibilities so that everyone can have more confidence once programs are initiated. The continuing development and evaluation of EMAS provides important additional information and should be examined more closely by EPA.
Areas of focus suggested by the comparison of EMAS and Performance Track include the repeated findings of negative incidence avoidance and risk management in the EMAS studies, which are not mentioned in the Performance Track studies. In fact, EPA does not recognize either of those items as even potential benefits of EMSs on its website.
216
To achieve sustainability and address the significant environmental issues like climate change, we also need to explore all forms of contribution from all stakeholders, including regulators, industry, communities, and NGOs. One possibility for pulling these diverse groups together in a constructive way is to investigate options for collaborative governance mechanisms. Collaborative governance was an initial cornerstone of President Barack Obama's presidency:
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government. The Collaborative Law movement could be instructive in establishing effective forums and processes. This movement was developed in the early 1990s to overcome the contentious divorce and child custody cases fostered by the adversarial process. 218 It has transformed the practice of family law.
219
Given the often adversarial relationships among regulators, regulated facilities, communities, and environmental NGOs, it is worth investigating the Collaborative Law process for ways to move towards sustainability. Another important question raised by the comparison of the EMAS and Performance Track studies is what value extroverts have in the environmental arena. Because EMSs require the collection of a significant amount of information about environmental operations and governmentally sponsored programs like EMAS integrate the development of that information with disclosure requirements, they could provide a platform for implementing collaborative environmental governance to address the many significant issues we face. As the RAND Assessment concluded, "[e]xperimental programs should be developed and operated openly" with the participation of all stakeholders.
220
Other important questions include: 1) how large an EMAS or Performance Track program should be; and 2) whether it should be inclusive, to encourage as many facilities to join as possible, or exclusive, to recognize top performers who may provide leadership and important innovations. 221 The answer to those questions will require further research. The lack of answers, however, should not deter governments from moving forward with program development, especially in light of emerging research that "a regulatory scheme can be designed to exploit certification," and when combined with traditional enforcement mechanisms "can lead to substantially greater environmental performance."
222
EMSs have the potential for delivering significant and continuing value. The United States should revisit voluntary programs like Performance Track, utilizing the information developed by EMAS and other governmental EMS-based programs around the world.
